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Corporate Governance Regimes 
and Employment Relations  
in Europe
Marc Goergen, Chris Brewster and Geoffrey Wood
An influential strand of the finance literature focuses on the nature and extent of 
shareholder rights vis-à-vis employees. most of the extant literature on the subject 
relies on a limited number of case studies and/or broad macroeconomic data, 
whereas this article draws on evidence from a large scale survey of organizations 
to test the predictions of the theories on the relative strength of workers and 
managers across the different governance regimes. This evidence highlights the 
complex relationship between societal institutions, legal traditions, political parties 
and electoral systems, on corporate governance regimes and the relative strength of 
unions and collective representation at workplace level, highlighting the limitations 
of the mainstream finance and economics rational-incentive based literature, and 
the value of alternative socio-economic approaches.
KEyWORDS: corporate governance, comparative industrial relations, trade union 
strength, neo-institutionalism, varieties of capitalism, regulation theory
introduction
This is a study of the relationship between institutions, corporate governance and union 
power based on large scale comparative survey evidence. An influential strand of the 
finance literature focuses on shareholder rights (see La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). More 
recently, this literature has been expanded to look at how other markets – including 
labour markets – are regulated, and the relationship between this and shareholder 
rights (see Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2003). For example, Botero et al. (2004) 
analyze the link between laws on collective action and investor protection. However, the 
mainstream finance literature remains dominated by rational hierarchical approaches 
that see institutional effects primarily in terms of constraints on rational actors, focusing 
on the relative strength of property rights, looking at the effects of law, constitutions 
and politics (Djankov et al., 2003: 596). In reaction, an emerging body of socio-
economic literature has provided criticisms of such approaches on three fronts. First, 
owner and stakeholder behaviour may not simply reflect state-regulatory pressures 
or the absence thereof; institutional pressures operate at a wide range of levels and 
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domains, encompassing markets, civil society, organizations (Boyer, 2006: 36–37). 
Second, institutional complementarity may not necessarily emerge from mutually 
supportive features but may, in fact, arise from contradictions (Crouch, 2005: 360–362); 
hence, strong employee rights may not necessarily preclude strong ownership rights, 
or, indeed, effective organizational performance. Mutually beneficial complementarities 
in turn, are likely to reinforce specific industrial relations practices even if, over time, 
both will be subject to redefinition and change (Hopner, 2005). Third, employees and 
managers are not passive subjects of external institutional forces, but make choices of 
their own, moulding organizational outcomes, and impacting on the relative powers 
of owners (Gospel and Pendleton, 2004). This reflects a key difference in underlying 
assumptions: rational-incentive approaches focus on the manner in which individuals 
seek to maximize their own benefit. In contrast, socio-economic accounts give a central 
place to the issue of relationships (encompassing both individuals and associations) and 
the manner in which such relationships are regulated (Hall and Gingerich, 2004). 
The predictions of rational-incentive approaches therefore deserve further 
investigation and critique, given that they constitute the dominant strand of the 
mainstream economics and finance literature and have been particularly influential in 
guiding policy makers in liberal market economies. As Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 612–
613) note, evaluating and critiquing the full range of different accounts on corporate 
governance and firm behaviour is of value, both in understanding what firms do (both 
broadly and in the area of industrial relations) and in developing alternative, critical and 
more explicitly multi-dimensional alternatives. In this article, we systematically assess 
and critique the predictions of rational hierarchical approaches to corporate governance 
on the relative strength of employees and their collectives in different national and 
organizational settings, and critically reappraise the implications thereof, and the 
relevance of alternative approaches within the heterodox socio-economic tradition.
rational-incentives approaches
Rational-incentives approaches see institutions as constraints on the ability of rational 
profit maximizing individuals to make optimal decisions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; North, 1990). As Ezzamel and Reed (2008: 611) note, 
such approaches combine “the neo-rationalist emphasis on rational calculation and 
action with more recent theoretical reinterpretations that give greater emphasis to 
the strategic role of political and cultural power in reshaping modes of collective 
regulation,” and, hence, individual choices and actions.
Of particular concern is the issue of property rights: approaches adopting this 
starting point have been particularly influential in the literature on finance and 
corporate governance (Djankov et al., 2003: 596). In practice, the rational-incentives 
approaches assign paramount importance to hierarchy, with dominant relations 
imposing isomorphism (Boyer, 2006). The role of owners is given particular attention; 
other social actors are treated as potential hinderers – or, at best, facilitators – on the 
effective operation of markets (see North, 1990). When hierarchies do not operate 
effectively, the system does not work optimally. Institutional settings create a particular 
process of decision making, leading to optimal or sub-optimal outcomes.
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rational incentive accounts of the relationship between 
the Firm and its stakeholders 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) see shareholders as the only stakeholders with sunk funds 
in the firm; hence they argue that the firm’s sole objective should be the maximization 
of their wealth. Similarly, Roe (2003) believes that improving the conditions of workers 
merely worsens the classical agency problem between managers and shareholders 
and prevents the separation of ownership and control.1 In detail, the classical agency 
problem consists of managers’ tendency to focus on corporate growth rather than 
on shareholder value. Roe (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) both suggest 
that employers and employees prefer bigger firms, the former in the interests of 
empire building, and the latter as they tend to provide better working conditions 
and job security. Hence, in countries with left wing governments, ownership and 
control will remain concentrated to counteract managers’ tendency towards empire 
building. Conversely, countries with right wing governments will favour investors over 
professional managers and workers; ownership will separate from control as investors 
are well protected by law from abuses by corporate managers (Roe, 2003).
Stakeholder Power and Politics
Developments and extensions of rational-incentive approaches have factored 
in the impact of institutions but only in terms of being providers of incentives or 
disincentives on rational actors. Pagano and Volpin (2005) hypothesize that the type 
of electoral system – a proportional or majoritarian electoral system – is the main 
determining factor of the levels of protection that employees and investors have. 
Whereas a majority of votes ensures victory in a proportional system, one needs to 
win a majority of districts in a majoritarian system. Pagano and Volpin (2005: 1016) 
predict that the former produces strong workers’ rights but weak investor protection, 
as it makes politicians focus on social groups with homogeneous preferences, i.e. 
workers and their unions, and managers, at the expense of owners. A majoritarian 
system produces the exact opposite outcome.
Type of Legal System
La Porta et al. (1997) had previously distinguished between two main families of law, 
common law and civil law. Common law, the legal system of the UK, US and most 
Commonwealth countries, accords an important role to the judges who make law in 
the courts by setting precedents. In contrast, civil law, the legal systems of Continental 
Europe and most of the rest of the world, is based on extensive codes of law – having 
their origins in Roman law – and the role of the judges is limited to interpreting 
these codes in the courts.2 La Porta et al. (1997) argue that, given its higher flexibility 
and better enforcement, common law provides stronger investor protection than civil 
law. Further, among the civil law family, French civil law provides the lowest levels 
of shareholder protection, followed by German civil law and then Scandinavian civil 
law. More recently, La Porta and colleagues have argued that legal systems shape 
the regulation of a wide range of markets, including labour (Botero et al., 2004: 
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1379), with civil law countries being characterized by the direct regulation of markets 
(including labour markets) by governments (ibid.: 1340). In particular, Botero et al. 
(2004) find that civil law markets have more extensive law governing employment 
relations as well as industrial relations, i.e. collective actions by the workers.
Summarizing Rational Hierarchical Approaches
Key similarities in these approaches can be summarized as per Figure 1; Table 1 further 
illustrates differences and similarities.
TABLE 1
Context and Practice – Alternative Perspectives
Theory / Characteristic roe pagano and volpin la porta et al.
Determines strength of Government policy electoral system legal system 
non-owner stakeholders and ideology
Measure left or right wing proportional representation (pr)  Common or civil law 
 governments or first past the post
Path dependence path dependence limited number of alternatives.  path dependence 
  electoral systems rarely changed
Predictions –  property owners stronger under property owners stronger property owners stronger 
Shareholder rights right wing governments under majoritarian systems under common law 
Predictions –  right wing governments are First past the post electoral Common law systems are 
Employee rights likely to make for weaker systems are likely to make   likely to make for weaker  
 employee rights and, hence, for weaker employee rights,   employee rights and,  
 fewer constraints on and hence, fewer constraints hence, fewer constraints   
 on corporate governance on corporate governance on corporate governance 
Number of optimal 
arrangements one one one
This literature, as noted, advocates the maximization of shareholder value, 
privileging the role of the owners of the business who have sunk funds in the 
firm. Owner and employee rights are seen as a zero-sum game: should the one be 
stronger, the other will be weaker and vice versa. Hence, it is assumed that “carefully 
devised laws and sanctions . . . as well as carefully drafted employment contracts 
are necessary to provide the necessary carrots and sticks for workers to act in the 
FIGURE 1
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interests of owners” (Ezzamel and Reed, 2008). However, Goergen (2007) argues that 
workers and suppliers, similar to shareholders, have sunk investments in the firms 
they deal with and that they are equally likely to lose these investments when the 
firm disappears. Hence, the question of employee rights is central to the analysis of 
the nature of corporate governance not simply in terms of something that negatively 
or positively impacts on the manner in which the firm can be governed: labour is not 
simply another commodity that can be purchased and disposed of. Recent work on 
corporate governance has focused on this lacuna, and sought to explain how specific 
ownership regimes impact on both managers and labour and, indeed, the manner in 
which employees and their collectives influence both owners and managers (Johnstone, 
2007: 94; Gospel and Pendleton, 2003: 559; Gospel and Pendleton, 2004). 
socio-economic alternatives
Recent critiques have suggested that institutional features that are seemingly at 
odds with each other may, in fact, generate complementarities in compensating 
or balancing contrasting components: for example, industry relevant skills may 
offset pressures towards low labour mobility in other areas (Crouch, 2005: 
360–362); institutional pressures operate at a wide range of levels and domains 
(Boyer, 2006: 36–37). 
These critiques raise two fundamental issues. First, there is the question as 
to whether rational-hierarchical approaches to analyzing institutional effects are 
sufficient for understanding managerial choices and, in turn, the relative power of 
employees and their collectives. Second, the “mixed” approach to understanding 
institutional effects highlighted by Crouch (2005: 360–362) emphasizes that strong 
shareholder powers do not necessarily make for weak unions. The relative strength 
of employee collectives may depend on complementarities elsewhere in the system; 
the relative strength of civil society, and a wide range of non-shareholder framed 
enablers and constraints on managerial behaviour. Managers and other stakeholders 
are not simply passive subjects of ownership behaviour, but active agents making 
strategic choices that may mould outcomes (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003: 559). 
These issues deserve closer investigation.
In contrast to rational-incentive approaches, and from a heterodox starting point, 
a burgeoning body of socio-economic literature (Dore, 2000; Whitley, 1999; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001) locates institutions in terms of webs of relationships (rather than 
individual selfish action) (Ezzamel and Reed, 2008). Hall and Gingerich (2004: 7) note 
that in order to effectively manage their people, firms “have to engage with multiple 
spheres of the political economy.”
The Varieties of Capitalism literature argues that a key distinction is between 
liberal market economies (LMEs) and the coordinated market alternatives (CMEs). 
Examples of the former would include Britain and the United States, and, of the 
latter, continental North Western Europe. Such literature does highlight the continued 
viability – and distinct paths – of alternatives to lightly regulated liberal markets. 
And, as relationships may make for mutually beneficial complementarities, there is 
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no inherent reason why employee and owner well-being should be antagonistic or 
mutually exclusive; rather, it has been argued that in CMEs, a more sustainable basis 
for prosperity is provided through mutually beneficial trade offs and compromises 
between key stakeholders (see Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Dore, 2000). Whilst the 
limits of rational-incentive approaches to understanding industrial relations may be 
immediately evident, the Varieties of Capitalism literature is not without problems. 
Firstly, a two-archetype model discounts the important differences that exist 
between coordinated markets, and the importance of other types of capitalism, such 
as the Mediterranean variety(ies) (Amable, 2003; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). This 
makes such approaches only of limited utility in seeking to understand the differences 
in industrial relations practice in continental Europe. A second limitation is that such 
approaches – in common with rational-incentive approaches – assume that national 
institutional frameworks are deeply embedded, and unlikely to change significantly 
over time (Boyer, 2006). 
Alternative approaches to understanding institutions from regulationist and 
historical institutionalist starting points share the Varieties of Capitalism’s focus on 
relationships, associations, and informal and formal rules. However, the former has 
stressed the temporary, and inherently unstable nature of institutional mediation, and 
the uneven nature of systemic evolution and change (Boyer, 2006). Meanwhile, the 
latter sees institutions as flexible and dynamic, although at specific times, coherences 
will be evident at national and regional levels (Lane and Wood, 2009). From a 
range of different starting points, a number of different writers have also sought to 
broaden the range of capitalist archetypes, from a simple LME/CME dichotomy, inter 
alia to identify differences between European coordinated markets, and Far Eastern 
alternatives (Whitley, 1999), and between Scandinavia and continental Europe 
(Amable, 2003). Both these accounts give very much more detailed attention to the 
types of difference in industrial relations that are likely to be encountered in different 
contexts; again, both identify unionization, the central focus of this paper, as a key 
dimension. 
Data and methodology
In this paper, we aim to test the veracity of the claims of the rational incentive 
approaches, and explore the extent to which any limitations may be accounted for 
within the socio-economic literature on comparative capitalism. Our study benefits 
from longitudinal data sourced from the Cranet database. Cranet is a survey of HR 
managers. It relies mostly on closed-ended questions in order to preclude prevarication 
and/or ambiguous responses. The Cranet survey is conducted every 3 to 4 years. Over 
time, the number of countries surveyed has increased. The latest survey, the 2003/4 
survey, covers a total of 41 countries from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, developed 
countries such as the USA, Japan and Australia as well as transitional economies such 
as South Africa, Turkey and Tunisia. Other surveys were conducted in 1991, 1995 and 
1999/2000. The surveys aim to be representative of each economy at each point in 
time by covering all sectors of the target countries’ economies. For the vast majority 
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of countries, they are full population surveys. For a smaller number of the larger 
countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy and the UK), firms were selected randomly, but 
weighted for sector and size, from publicly available mailing lists. The surveys exclude 
smaller firms, i.e. those with less than 100 employees. 
To ensure data is available across the various years, this paper is based on the 1995, 
1999/2000 and 2003/2004 surveys and focuses on firms3 from Western European 
countries only. In the empirical analysis, we use time dummy variables to identify 
observations from the three waves of surveys and to detect possible behavioural shifts 
across time. Due to the confidential nature of the data involved, firms forming the 
panel in a given year cannot be matched with those from other years. Since our 
interest is in developments in national economies over time, rather than in the effects 
on individual organizations, this detailed, representative data from three different 
points in time over more than a decade is appropriate for our purposes.4
We use two measures of the influence of trade unions.5 The first one is the 
proportion of the total number of employees in each company that are members of 
a trade union. Central to the strength of unions is an ability to draw members into 
the fold, and organize them: “unions (only) exist wherever workers are unionized” 
(Hyman, 2002: 55; Kelly, 1998: 126–127); in turn, union membership provides the 
basis for collective bargaining and other forms of collective representation (Kelly, 
2002: xli). In the survey questionnaire, the variable is ordinal in nature and takes on 
the following values: 0 if the proportion of employees who are members of trade 
unions is 0%; 1 if it is between 1–10%; 2 if it is between 11–25%; 3 if the proportion 
is between 26–50%; and 4 and 5 if it is between 51–75% and 76–100%, respectively. 
This variable measures the current power of unions within a given firm, and, reflects 
their ability to attract and retain workers (c.f. Checchi and Visser, 2005: 7–8).
The second measure captures the change in the perceived influence of unions, i.e. 
respondents’ views on the degree of change in the influence of trade unions in a firm 
during the previous three years. This potentially captures two alternative phenomena: 
the actual extent to which unions’ influence in the firm has increased or decreased, 
and/or the extent to which management believes (whether based on concrete 
evidence or not) that union strength is increasing or decreasing. Management also 
influences union strength. The relationship between firms and unions is essentially 
about power and the distribution of resources (Hyman, 2002: 62–63): if managers 
see unions as weak, they may seek to push them back even further, leading to a 
further weakening of unions (Kelly, 1998; Kelly, 2002: xli; Hyman, 2002). Hence, 
this question measures not just union strength, but the likelihood that managers will 
adopt a harder line towards them (c.f. Kelly, 1998: 103–104). This is also an ordinal 
variable which takes on a value of zero if unions have had no influence, 1 if their 
perceived influence has decreased, 2 if their influence has remained the same, and 
3 if union influence has increased. As both measures of union influence are discrete 
and there is also a clear order of preference between the different values they can 
take, the appropriate estimation technique is an ordered logit. Each logit regression 
contains industry dummies6 and year dummies. 
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For each measure of trade union influence, we run four separate ordered logit 
regressions. Each logit is estimated using the pooled company-level data for 1995, 
1999/2000 and 2003/2004. The first logit is a test of La Porta et al.’s (1997) legal 
theory. The logit contains three dummies: one for common law countries, another one 
for countries with German law and a third one for countries with Scandinavian law. 
This implies that the base case will be that of the countries of French law, the group of 
countries with the weakest investor protection. The second and third logits test Roe’s 
(2003) politics theory. Both logits use politics indices from Cusack and Engelhardt 
(2006). The first ordered logit regression is based on RILE which ranges from –100 
(extreme left) to +100 (extreme right). The index measures the political orientation 
of the party in power based on its views on a wide range of economic and social 
issues. This index is identical to that used by Roe (2003: 49–50) himself. The second 
logit uses MYRL as the main explanatory variable. This index is more specialized as it 
measures the political orientation of the party in power in terms of its views on ten 
different issues concerning the regulation of markets and wealth distribution. Similar 
to RILE, it ranges from –100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right). Finally, the fourth 
type of logit is based on Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) proportionality index. The index, 
which is available for 1985–2002, is equal to zero if none of the seats are assigned 
via a proportionality rule, 1 if a minority of seats are assigned by such a rule, 2 if 
the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, and 3 if all of the seats are assigned 
proportionally.7 All the logits contain industry and year dummies.8 
Findings
Tables 2 to 4 report the results for the various ordered logits. The tables report the 
regressions based on the proportion of employees who are members of a trade union. 
The equivalent regressions for the change in the perceived influence of trade unions 
are discussed in what follows, but not reported in tabular form. Table 2 contains the 
results for the logit explaining the proportion of employees in the trade union by La 
Porta et al.’s (1997) legal families. First, the threshold variables in the ordered logit are 
all highly significant, suggesting that an ordered logit is the appropriate estimation 
technique. The various types of pseudo R-squares are also relatively high, ranging from 
0.131 to 0.338. Second, the dummies for the three families of common, German and 
Scandinavian law are all highly significant. In particular, the coefficient on the common 
law dummy is negative, suggesting that trade union penetration is lower in countries of 
the common law variety. However, contrary to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2000) 
and Botero et al. (2004), union membership is higher in countries with German law (the 
coefficient on the German law dummy is significant and positive) and highest in those 
with Scandinavian law (the coefficient on the Scandinavian law dummy significant and 
even higher) relative to countries of French law. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that 
virtually all of the industry dummies are significant and positive. This suggests that the 
influence of trade unions varies across industries as well as across the various legal 
families; in part, this could reflect industry specific variations in work organization, and 
in the relative centralization of bargaining (see Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). The 
year dummies are both significant and positive with the year dummy for 1995 having 
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the highest coefficient. This would reflect the fact that the proportion of employees 
who are members of a trade union has dropped gradually over 1995 to 2003/4 in many 
national contexts. In turn, this would reflect the general weakening in the influence of 
unions that has followed on the long period of prosperity and growth that ended in the 
early 1970s, and the structural changes in the global economy that followed it; whilst 
unions have fared better in some national contexts than others, most have battled to 
stem declining memberships, revitalization strategies notwithstanding (Kelly, 1998; c.f. 
Checchi and Visser, 2005; Western, 1993). 
TABLE 2
La Porta et al. – Proportion of Employees in Trade Union
  Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig.  95% Confidence Interval
   Lower Bound Upper Bound
threshold [propunion2 = .00] –�.404 .�23 �29.208 � .000 –�.646 –�.�62
  [propunion2 = �.00] .2�3 .�22 3.056 � .080 –.026 .452
  [propunion2 = 2.00] �.0�8 .�22 69.��0 � .000 .778 �.257
  [propunion2 = 3.00] 2.�55 .�24 30�.�84 � .000 �.9�� 2.398
location Common_law –.�02 .048 4.472 � .034 –.�96 –.007
  German_law .306 .057 28.843 � .000 .�94 .4�7
  scan_law 2.663 .06� �887.2�4 � .000 2.543 2.783
  ind2 .42� .�58 7.055 � .008 .��0 .73�
  ind3 .5�5 .�46 �2.508 � .000 .230 .80�
  ind4 .309 .�25 6.�09 � .0�3 .064 .555
  ind5 .566 .�26 20.269 � .000 .320 .8�3
  ind6 .069 .�50 .2�4 � .643 –.225 .363
  ind7 –.907 .�33 46.33� � .000 –�.�69 –.646
  ind8 .257 .�44 3.�83 � .074 –.025 .540
  ind9 –.976 .�30 56.080 � .000 –�.232 –.72�
  ind�0 –.750 .224 ��.�55 � .00� –�.�90 –.3�0
  ind�� .929 .�42 43.080 � .000 .65� �.206
  ind�2 –.�64 .�57 �.09� � .296 –.473 .�44
  ind�3 �.026 .�54 44.655 � .000 .725 �.327
  ind�4 �.309 .�45 8�.307 � .000 �.024 �.593
  ind�5 �.074 .�65 42.596 � .000 .75� �.396
  ind�6 –.20� .�34 2.234 � .�35 –.464 .062
  ind�7 2.664 .645 �7.067 � .000 �.400 3.927
  year95 .�75 .049 �2.573 � .000 .078 .27�
  year99 .087 .05� 2.938 � .087 –.0�2 .�86
Pseudo R-Square
Cox and snell .338
nagelkerke .353
mcFadden .�3�
the dependent variable in the ordered logit is an ordinal variable which equals 0 if the proportion of employees who are members of trade unions is 
0%; � if it is between �–�0%; 2 if it is between ��–25%; 3 if the proportion is between 26–50%; 4 if it is between 5�–75% and 5 if it exceeds 75%. 
Common_law, German_law and scan_law are dummy variables which equal � if the firm in question is from a country with common law, German law 
and scandinavian law, respectively, and equal 0 otherwise. the industry dummies are defined in endnote 6. 
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Regression results for the dependent variable showing the perceived change in the 
influence of trade unions over the three previous years are all highly significant (the 
results are not reported in a table).9 However, the pseudo R-squares are much lower: 
it seems that, in most instances, managers’ views on the strength of unions are not 
founded on wishful thinking (perhaps to justify a harder line approach to unions in 
the future) but rather are realistic (and indeed, cautious) estimates of the position and 
potential of unions. The results suggest that, relative to the French law family, the base 
case, trade unions in common law countries have suffered the highest perceived drop 
in their influence, closely followed by those in countries with German law. Conversely, 
trade unions in countries of the Scandinavian law tradition have benefited from a 
slight increase in their influence. Fewer of the industry dummies are significant than 
in the previous table, and some are positive and others negative; this would reflect 
the complexities of industry effects within and between sectors, reflecting the relative 
importance of specific production paradigms (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). The 
evidence here also suggests a clear cross-national decreasing trend in trade union 
influence. 
Table 3 tests the validity of Roe’s (2003) politics theory using the Cusack and 
Engelhardt (2006) politics index RILE, which covers the government’s orientation in 
terms of a wide range of social and economic issues. All of the threshold variables 
are significant. The coefficient on RILE is significantly negative which suggests that 
the influence of trade unions, as measured by the proportion of employees who 
have membership, is lower in countries with right wing governments. This provides 
support for Roe’s (2003) politics thesis. Our findings also echo those of Checchi and 
Visser (2005: 14) that the efforts of right wing governments to curtail union power 
negatively impacted on union density; however, Western (1993: 277) suggests these 
effects may be lagged. Further, compared to the regressions based on La Porta et al., 
the values for the pseudo R-squares tend to be much lower (by as much as a factor of 
about 3). Compared to Table 2, most of the industry dummies are significant. Similar 
to Table 2, not all of the significant dummies are positive. In particular, the industry 
dummies for sectors providing services to public institutions are highly significant and 
positive. This may reflect the privatization of central and local government services 
over the period of study. Private sector organizations taking over the provision of 
public services may have inherited workers who have had traditionally a high trade 
union representation and who would now have to fight for their collective rights 
(Dibben et al., 2007). Again, the dummy for the year 1995 is significantly positive, 
suggesting a decreasing trend in union membership over 1995–2003/4. The results 
for the ordered logit explaining the proportion of employees in the trade unions by 
the more specialized politics index, MYRL, confirm the results from Table 4.10 Again, 
trade unions seem to have less influence under right wing governments. Similar 
conclusions can also be drawn as to the industry and year dummies. Estimation 
results for ordered logits11 explaining the perceived change in the influence of trade 
unions using the RILE and MYRL politics index, respectively, as the main explanatory 
variable, suggest that perceived trade union influence has decreased during 
conservative governments. 
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TABLE 3
Roe (Politics Index) – Proportion of Employees in Trade Union 
  Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
threshold [propunion2 = .00] –�.745 .��7 222.482 � .000 –�.974 –�.5�5
  [propunion2 = �.00] –.297 .��5 6.659 � .0�0 –.522 –.07�
  [propunion2 = 2.00] .370 .��5 �0.324 � .00� .�44 .595
  [propunion2 = 3.00] �.253 .��6 ��7.340 � .000 �.027 �.480
location rile –.003 .00� 20.306 � .000 –.004 –.00�
  ind2 .362 .�52 5.694 � .0�7 .065 .660
  ind3 .28� .�40 4.0�5 � .045 .006 .556
  ind4 .�37 .�20 �.29� � .256 –.099 .373
  ind5 .377 .�2� 9.738 � .002 .�40 .6�4
  ind6 .05� .�44 .�27 � .722 –.23� .334
  ind7 –.73� .�29 32.264 � .000 –.983 –.479
  ind8 .434 .�38 9.88� � .002 .�63 .704
  ind9 –.926 .�26 53.987 � .000 –�.�73 –.679
  ind�0 –.386 .2�7 3.�54 � .076 –.8�2 .040
  ind�� .640 .�35 22.40� � .000 .375 .905
  ind�2 –.073 .�5� .233 � .629 –.369 .223
  ind�3 .724 .�46 24.576 � .000 .438 �.0�0
  ind�4 �.262 .�37 85.�69 � .000 .994 �.530
  ind�5 �.09� .�54 50.004 � .000 .788 �.393
  ind�6 –.�88 .�30 2.�02 � .�47 –.442 .066
  ind�7 �.906 .648 8.653 � .003 .636 3.�76
  year95 .364 .048 58.040 � .000 .27� .458
  year99 –.063 .049 �.649 � .�99 –.�58 .033
 Pseudo R-Square
 Cox and snell .���
 nagelkerke .��6
 mcFadden .037
the dependent variable in the ordered logit is an ordinal variable which equals 0 if the proportion of employees who are members of trade unions is 
0%; � if it is between �–�0%; 2 if it is between ��–25%; 3 if the proportion is between 26–50%; 4 if it is between 5�–75% and 5 if it exceeds 75%. 
rile ranges from –�00 (extreme left) to +�00 (extreme right). the index measures the political orientation of the party in power based on its views on 
a wide range of economic and social issues. the industry dummies are defined in endnote 6.
Table 4 uses Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) proportionality index as the main 
explanatory variable of the proportion of employees in the trade unions.12 As 
suggested, the power of workers seems to be higher in countries that allocate a 
higher proportion of parliamentary seats via the proportionality rule. The pseudo 
R-squares for the regression explaining the proportion of workers who are members 
of trade unions are relatively high. However, they are not more pronounced than 
those for the regression on the perceived change in the influence of trade unions, 
confirming the argument that managerial assessments of changes in union 
influence are generally realistic. Once more the figures reflect the decline in union 
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power since 1995. Again, the level and evolution of trade union influence have 
been different across various industry sectors and these patterns hold across various 
national systems.
TABLE 4
Pagano and Volpin’s Proportionality Index – Proportion of Employees in Trade Union
  Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
threshold [propunion2 = .00] –.784 .�20 42.389 � .000 –�.020 –.548
  [propunion2 = �.00] .792 .�20 43.854 � .000 .558 �.027
  [propunion2 = 2.00] �.5�8 .�20 �59.092 � .000 �.282 �.753
  [propunion2 = 3.00] 2.487 .�22 4�6.5�8 � .000 2.249 2.726
location propvot .56� .0�5 �339.�02 � .000 .53� .59�
  ind2 .384 .�53 6.3�6 � .0�2 .085 .684
  ind3 .30� .�4� 4.549 � .033 .024 .578
  ind4 .320 .�2� 6.99� � .008 .083 .558
  ind5 .6�7 .�22 25.567 � .000 .378 .856
  ind6 .�62 .�45 �.244 � .265 –.�23 .447
  ind7 –.555 .�29 �8.382 � .000 –.809 –.30�
  ind8 .5�9 .�39 �3.865 � .000 .246 .792
  ind9 –.799 .�27 39.7�4 � .000 –�.048 –.55�
  ind�0 –.386 .2�9 3.�09 � .078 –.8�6 .043
  ind�� .933 .�37 46.274 � .000 .664 �.202
  ind�2 .254 .�53 2.779 � .095 –.045 .554
  ind�3 �.246 .�49 69.652 � .000 .953 �.538
  ind�4 �.537 .�40 �2�.208 � .000 �.263 �.8�0
  ind�5 �.23� .�57 6�.26� � .000 .923 �.539
  ind�6 –.�68 .�30 �.654 � .�98 –.423 .088
  ind�7 3.�53 .647 23.732 � .000 �.884 4.42�
  year95 .3�� .048 42.079 � .000 .2�7 .405
  year99 –.�35 .050 7.387 � .007 –.232 –.038
 Pseudo R-Square
 Cox and snell .225
 nagelkerke .235
 mcFadden .08�
the dependent variable in the ordered logit is an ordinal variable which equals 0 if the proportion of employees who are members of trade unions is 
0%; � if it is between �–�0%; 2 if it is between ��–25%; 3 if the proportion is between 26–50%; 4 if it is between 5�–75% and 5 if it exceeds 75%. 
proportionality index. the index, which is available for �985–2002, is equal to zero if none of the seats are assigned via a proportionality rule, � if a 
minority of seats are assigned by such a rule, 2 if the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, and 3 if all of the seats are assigned proportionally. 
the industry dummies are defined in endnote 6.
To summarize, based on the pseudo R-squares in the regressions, Pagano and 
Volpin’s (2005) theory seems to work best in terms of explaining both the level of trade 
union influence and the perceived change in trade union influence. Although the type 
of legal family has an influence on the power of trade unions, the effects are different 
from those that one would expect based on La Porta et al. (1997). In particular, French 
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law, which according to La Porta et al. fares worst in terms of investor protection, 
does not seem to have the strongest trade unions even if, arguably, those unions have 
a disproportionate influence at national level. Roe’s (2003) politics thesis works, but 
relatively less than Pagano and Volpin’s theory.
Conclusions: The Limits and Possibilities of Theory
The survey revealed that the strongest indicator of union strength was national legal 
tradition, suggesting a significant degree of path dependence. However, it cannot 
be concluded that this difference is only due to investor protection, allowing owners 
more or less room to impose their wishes on the workforce. As noted earlier, in terms 
of La Porta et al.’s index of shareholder protection, and their later work on employee 
rights (Botero et al., 2004), we would expect countries of French law to have the 
highest union influence, followed by countries of German and Scandinavian law, 
when in fact the converse is the case. 
Why would this be so? As suggested by the industrial relations literature, this 
could reflect both investor protection and the practical operation of labour law: in 
other words, the relationship between institutional setting and practice cannot be 
explained solely in terms of a single hierarchy. First, relatively weak shareholder rights 
do not necessarily make for strong unions or vice versa. For example, if shareholders 
are weak, managers may enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy; the manner and 
scope in which they exercise this is likely to be constrained and enabled by wider civil 
society, inter-firm relations and state policies in a range of different areas. Conversely, 
in a number of civil law contexts, relatively strong ownership protection appears to 
have coexisted with strong employee rights (Johnstone, 2007: 96; Jackson, 2004: 
284–309). Second, and as a result, investor protection constitutes an incomplete basis 
for understanding the effects of different national legal traditions. Different legal 
traditions will affect shareholder rights directly, but will also affect those of employees 
in a manner that transcends the simple operation of markets. The manner in which 
employees seek to enforce their rights is an open-ended process, with, especially in 
common law systems, not always predictable results. 
This does not mean that common law systems will necessarily work better for 
employers. Whilst employees may have fewer rights that are harder to enforce, 
common law systems may result in excessive levels of litigation, constraining 
management flexibility in a range of areas concerning the employment contract 
(Colvin, 2006: 73); this is particularly the case, given that such systems are often 
associated with strong – and expanding – individual rights, in areas such as equality 
and anti-discrimination (c.f. ibid.: 91; Wood, Harcourt and Harcourt, 2004). Civil law 
systems are indeed diverse, though not necessarily in the manner predicted by La 
Porta and colleagues; indeed, it seems that in some instances, increases in investor 
rights have proved compatible with cooperative industrial relations involving strong 
unions (Johnstone, 2007: 96; Jackson, 2004: 284–309).
Whilst not providing quite such a strong fit, the Pagano and Volpin model also 
provides some measure of union strength: rentier power is greater in majoritarian 
Corporate GovernanCe reGimes and employment relations in europe 633
systems, which may facilitate a harder line against unions. However, again, a caveat 
is in order: we found that the level and evolution of trade union influence have 
been different across various industry sectors which would reflect the operation of 
other factors at work. In other words, the relationship between electoral system and 
firm level practice did not appear to operate as a single hierarchy – there is more 
to understanding the relative strength of employees than simply as the opposite of 
shareholder rights. This unevenness would include the effectiveness of the operation 
– or lack thereof – of bargaining arrangements as a check on employer power; highly 
centralized bargaining – ultimately in the form of neo-corporatist deal making – 
may have uneven effects on sectoral practices (Harcourt and Wood, 2003). A neo-
corporatist tradition equips unions better to survive the vicissitudes of right wing 
governments or, indeed, internal strategic blunders (c.f. Turner, 2004; Kelly and Frege, 
2004). Proportional democracy is more likely also to lead to coalition governments 
and these may, in turn, facilitate neo-corporatism (Olsen, 1982). Indeed, almost all of 
the countries where sustainable neo-corporatist deals have been reached have had 
proportional representation or mixed systems; in turn, the former are likely to make 
for higher levels of union density (Western, 1993). There is also a strong correlation 
between participative structures at the workplace, and propensity to participate 
in the wider political life; a history of workplace co-determinist structures in many 
proportional representation systems is likely both to strengthen pluralism in the 
workplace and to make union members more likely to vote (D’Art and Turner, 2007: 
107). Hence, collective employee representation at the workplace is likely to make 
pro-labour parties more successful in national level elections and vice versa (ibid.). 
In contrast, with a majoritarian system, the rentier grouping is likely to be relatively 
strong, driving trends towards patronage and elite based politics, strengthening the 
hand of the property-owning classes (Warner, 1997: 542). 
A somewhat less strong predictor was the Cusack and Engelhardt index of right or 
left wing governments; as the literature suggests, right wing governments are worse 
for unions and collective representation at the workplace. However, there appeared 
more to this relationship than a simple hierarchy: union strength varied on a sectoral 
basis, reflecting the operation of other dynamics.
A further three caveats are in order. First, the weakening of the traditional model 
of union-party relations commonly encountered in social democracies (c.f. Valenzuela, 
2002; McIlroy, 1998) makes it difficult to conclude that a left wing government will 
be consistently union friendly. Second, the role of right wing governments may vary 
from concentrating on protecting investor rights, to a more active role in curbing the 
organizing and mobilizing activities of unions (Gamble, 2002). Third, different state 
and institutional traditions may limit the powers of elected governments vis-à-vis a 
range of social collectives (Turner, 2004). And, institutional mediation is often open 
ended and incomplete (Ogden and Watson, 2008). These caveats may explain why 
legal traditions are a stronger predictor of union strength; however, it would be wrong 
to conclude that this means that owners are necessarily worse off. The literature on 
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neo-corporatism highlights the extent to which, in the Scandinavian and Rhineland 
countries, an emphasis on consensus, compromise and mutual understanding may 
provide a more sustainable basis for prosperity (Harcourt and Wood, 2003; Arestis 
and Marshall, 1995). Under such regimes, firms that take a longer view regarding 
the setting of wages and human resource development are not undermined by short-
termist less principled competitors poaching newly trained workers (Hall and Gingerich, 
2004; Henley and Tsakalotos, 1992; Harcourt and Wood, 2003). Again, firms based 
in such countries are likely to have stronger incentives to invest in employee skills 
development, on account of the greater security of tenure and rights enjoyed by 
the latter (Gospel and Pendleton, 2004: 4; Regini, 1997). Hence, we would argue 
for an approach that sees corporate governance and behaviour as more than simply 
variations in property rights and industrial relations.
notes
1 While Roe (2003) believes that improving the conditions of workers ultimately results in 
reducing the rights of investors, he does not argue that focusing on the latter is necessarily 
the superior of the two choices. However, given that, similar to e.g. Botero et al. (2004), he 
perceives that strong worker rights imply weaker investor rights, we feel that his theory fits 
better with the rational-incentives approaches.
2 Siems (2006), among others, argues that La Porta et al.’s typology based on legal families 
is simplistic and that company law and securities regulation are statutory in both common 
and civil law countries. Jurisprudence is also an increasingly significant source of law even in 
civil-law countries. 
3 Public organizations, which are also covered by the Cranet surveys, have been left out.
4 The surveys cover all sectors of each country’s economy but exclude organizations with less 
than 100 employees. Over the years, response rates in relationship to companies sampled 
have varied between years and countries with overall responses ranging from 15% to 22%. 
As an example of the country variations, for the 1999/2000 survey the overall response 
was 17% ranging from just over 10% (Italy) to 41% (Czech Republic). Although there is 
considerable debate as to acceptable response rates (Babbie, 1995: 261), the figures for the 
Cranet survey exceed those gained by professional marketing surveys of customers, which 
are widely deployed as a basis for management decision making (see Infosurvey, 2007). It 
is likely that those respondents who were most interested in the subject would be the most 
likely to reply, which, in turn, may be a partial reflection of how seriously the organization 
in question takes HRM: this constitutes a limitation of this research. Significantly, the surveys 
have consistently identified clear clusters of behaviour on size, sectoral and national lines.
5 General comparative figures are available on union density, which would allow a more 
systematic analysis than the survey of the relationship between union density and other 
labour market institutions (c.f. Checchi and Visser, 2005), but we chose to use the 
survey data for three reasons. First, the general data would only allow us to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance regime and a broad existing trend. This 
would preclude us from exploring the complexities of relationships between owners, 
managers and employees, and the extent to which, at firm level, the relative position of 
employee collectives is perceived to be changing by managers, both as agents of owners 
and autonomous actors in their own right (c.f. Pendleton and Deakin, 2007: 338-339). 
Second, the survey allows us to explore directly the effects of a corporate governance 
regime at firm level, and the relationship between firm level realities and perceptions with 
a broader objective context, taking into account detailed information available as to sector 
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and size (and, indeed, other firm-specific characteristics that may prove significant) (c.f. 
Pendleton and Deakin, 2007: 342). We note that the Cranet data on union membership 
tends to match closely the available national statistics on overall levels of membership 
in each country, though generally overstating membership as the survey excludes small 
firms. Third, unlike some measures of union density drawing on macro-economic data (for 
example, Western, 1993: 267), we only look at potential union members in employment, 
and do not include unemployed or retired workers: this is likely to provide a more accurate 
picture of actual union penetration rates at firm level. None of this is to dispute the value 
of alternative accounts based on broad nationwide trend data, or indeed, detailed plant 
level case studies. However, the relative neglect of firm level survey data in the corporate 
governance literature would suggest that such data sources deserve fuller utilization (ibid.; 
c.f. Checchi and Visser, 2005). 
6 The industry sectors (dummies) are as follows: Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing (IND1); 
Energy and water (IND2); Non-energy chemicals (IND3); Metal manufacture (IND4); Other 
manufacturing (IND5); Building and civil engineering (IND6); Distributive trades (IND7); 
Transport & communication (IND8); Banking & finance (IND9); Personal services (IND10); 
Health services (IND11); Other services (IND12); Education (IND13); Local government 
(IND14); Central government (IND15); Other (IND16); and Other public (IND17).
7 Some countries experience a change in their electoral system over 1991-2003. Italy is the 
most extreme example with a change from 3 to 1 in the proportionality index in 1994.
8 The results remain unchanged if the industry and time dummies are dropped. All of the logits 
were also initially run with a variable measuring the size of each company (the total number 
of employees). As this variable was not significant in any of the regressions, the regressions 
reported in this paper exclude this variable.
9 Tables detailing these tests are available from the authors.
10 The table is available from the authors.
11 Tables detailing these tests are available from the authors.
12 Similar results are found from estimates of trade union influence across the time period. 
Again, a table detailing these tests is available from the authors.
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résumé
La gouvernance des entreprises et les relations d’emploi  
en Europe
Cette étude porte sur les relations entre les institutions, la gouvernance des entreprises 
et le pouvoir syndical. Elle fait appel à une enquête comparative menée sur une grande 
échelle. Un courant important de publications dans le domaine de la finance traite des 
droits de l’actionnaire comme étant l’élément clef d’une compréhension de la manière 
dont les entreprises se comportent. Plus récemment, ces écrits ont pris de l’ampleur 
en abordant la manière dont d’autres types de marché, incluant le marché du travail, 
sont régulés et la relation entre ce phénomène et les droits de l’actionnaire. Le courant 
principal de la littérature d’ordre financier continue à être dominé par des approches 
hiérarchiques rationnelles, qui s’intéressent aux effets institutionnels d’abord et avant 
tout en termes de contraintes sur les acteurs rationnels en se centrant sur la force relative 
des droits de propriété et en s’intéressant aux effets de la législation, des constitutions 
et de la politique. En réaction à cette situation, un ensemble émergent de travaux de 
nature socio-économique a formulé des critiques à l’endroit de telles approches sur 
trois plans : en premier lieu, le comportement d’un propriétaire actionnaire peut bien 
tout simplement ne pas refléter les pressions d’une régulation étatique ou encore 
leur absence, en sachant que des pressions institutionnelles peuvent opérer à des 
niveaux et des domaines sur un vaste registre, incluant les marchés, la société civile 
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et les organisations. En deuxième lieu, la complémentarité des institutions peut ne 
pas nécessairement émerger des caractéristiques d’un support mutuel, mais elle peut 
en fait surgir des contradictions : de là, les droits forts de l’employé ne viennent pas 
nécessairement écarter des droits forts de propriété, ou vraiment, une performance 
effective des organisations. En troisième lieu, les employés et les dirigeants ne deviennent 
pas les sujets passifs de forces institutionnelles externes, mais ils font leur propre choix, 
ce qui vient modeler les résultats des organisations et exercer un impact sur les pouvoirs 
relatifs des propriétaires. 
Les prévisions qui découlent des approches rationnelles et incitatives méritent par 
conséquent qu’on pousse plus loin la recherche. Cependant, en dépit d’un ensemble 
imposant de travaux sur le traitement accordé aux actionnaires, – et aux prévisions 
sur la manière dont les dirigeants vont se comporter en conséquence et l’influence 
qu’ils auront sur les employés – il y a encore peu de preuve systématique comparative 
de la relation entre la force relative des syndicats au niveau d’un établissement, le 
régime national dominant de gouvernance corporative et la performance économique, 
lorsqu’on retient des données d’enquête au niveau de l’entreprise transnationale. Dans 
cet essai, nous procédons à une évaluation systématique des prévisions découlant des 
approches de gouvernance rationnelles et hiérarchiques dans leur traitement de la 
relation entre la force relative des employés et de leurs associations dans des contextes 
organisationnels et nationaux différents et nous réapprécions les implications qui en 
découlent.
Nous mettons en évidence les limites inhérentes contenues dans des approches 
rationnelles et incitatives à la compréhension des relations industrielles et, en fait, de la 
gouvernance des entreprises. Nous examinons aussi la pertinence d’alternatives socio-
économique émergentes.
Une analyse des observations de notre enquête révèle que, contrairement à bien 
des hypothèses des approches rationnelles hiérarchiques, il n’existe pas de preuve 
concrète de l’existence d’une relation entre des syndicats faibles (et en fait des droits 
d’actionnaires forts) et une forte performance à l’échelle macro-économique : la 
présence d’un syndicat peut déboucher sur des complémentarités entre des degrés 
élevés de participation, un investissement dans le capital humain et une production 
innovatrice d’une qualité de plus en plus remarquable. De fait, si la relation entre le 
pouvoir syndical et la performance globale entretenait un lien étroit, les employeurs 
iraient alors simplement se relocaliser là où les syndicats sont plus faibles, ou bien ils 
en viendraient à défier de façon constante des relations codéterministes. Clairement, 
des agencements différents de rapports institutionnels peuvent s’avérer bénéfiques 
de bien des manières, non pas d’une façon exclusivement de nature économique. De 
là, nous privilégierions une approche qui considère la gouvernance corporative et le 
comportement comme de simples variations des droits de propriété et des rapports 
sociaux, pas plus. Il y a plus dans le rôle et les effets des institutions que d’être de 
simples fournisseurs de stimulants (ou l’inverse) à des personnes rationnelles cherchant 
à valoriser au maximum la propriété. La preuve que nous avons accumulée au cours 
d’une décennie laisse croire à un dynamisme systémique mais également à une forme 
de discontinuité. 
MOTS-CLéS : gouvernance d’entreprise, relations industrielles comparées, force syndicale, 
néo-institutionalisme, diversités du capitalisme, théorie de la régulation
resumen
Regímenes de gobernanza corporativa y relaciones laborales 
en Europa
Una tendencia influyente de la literatura de finanzas se centra en la naturaleza y la 
amplitud de los derechos de los accionistas con respecto a los empleados. La mayoría 
de la literatura existente sobre el sujeto cuenta con una limitada cantidad de estudios 
de caso y/o con amplios datos macroeconómicos; por su lado, este artículo se basa en 
evidencias provenientes de una encuesta de gran escala sobre las organizaciones con el 
fin de evaluar las predicciones de las teorías sobre la fuerza relativa de los trabajadores 
y de la gerencia a través de los diferentes regímenes de gobernanza. La evidencia pone 
en relieve las complejas relaciones entre instituciones societales, tradiciones legales, 
partidos políticos y sistemas electorales, las interacciones sobre los regímenes de 
gobernanza corporativa y la fuerza relativa de los sindicatos y de las representaciones 
laborales directas. Se resalta así los límites de la literatura principal en finanzas y 
economía basada en el incentivo racional y el valor de los enfoques socio-económicos 
alternativos.
PALABRAS CLAVES: gobernanza corporativa, comparación de relaciones industriales, fuerza 
sindical, neo-institucionalismo, variedades de capitalismo, teoría de la regulación
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